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THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO COMMITTEES 
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: 
DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES 
Charles E. M. Kolbt 
Recent action by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the New York Stock Exchange make it clear that the 
Commission and the Exchange regard the delegation of 
corporate board of directors' authority to independent com-
mittees as beneficial to the public interest. In this Article, the 
author examines the potential for individual director liability 
that arises from such delegation of authority. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Directors' liability for improper delegation of authority is 
governed primarily by a state common law and statutory framework 
which yields outcomes depending upon the statutory language, the 
specific facts pe,rtaining to the corporation, and the director involved. 
The traditional "reliance liability" standard permits exculpation of a 
. director relying in good faith upon a committee acting under 
authority properly delegated. Many states adopt an "ordinarily 
prudent person" standard which would vary according to given 
director's experience, expertise, and exposure to the corporation's 
activities. Directors who serve on committees, therefore, assume 
greater liabilities than those who do not. 
When committees are required to be established, for example as 
part of a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) consent order 
or as part of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing 
requirements, it is unclear just how much pro forma compliance with 
these requirements will absolve the board as a whole from subse-
quent reliance liability. State common law and statutory provisions 
would still appear to be applicable. Nonetheless, the SEC has become 
more concerned in recent years that certain committees be both 
t A.B., 1973, Princeton University; B.A. Honours, 1975, M.A., 1980, BaIliol 
College, Oxford University; J.D., 1978, University of Virginia; Associate, 
Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; Member of the Maryland and District 
of Columbia Bars. The author wishes to acknowledge the editorial assistance of 
Judith A. Wood and Emanuel Demedis of the University of Baltimore Law 
Review. 
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meaningfully independent and truly effective. A manifestation of 
this concern is a trend among recent SEC actions and statements by 
commissioners calling for corporations to take their own initiatives 
in changing their board structures so as to increase corporate 
accountability to their shareholders and the public at large. 
Although the SEC professes to favor private initiative instead of 
governmental fiat, there are several indications that a federal 
standard of fiduciary duty on the part of directors may be emerging. 
This article will consider the degree of liability imposed upon 
members of a corporation's board of directors for actions taken by a 
board committee to which the board has delegated specific authority. 
The scope of such accountability is becoming increasingly important 
in light of concern by a number of SEC commissioners that 
management accountability would be rendered more meaningful to 
shareholders and society in general if key committees of the board of 
directors serve as independent checks on management activities. To 
this end, several SEC commissioners have endorsed the creation of 
more independent boards of directors and have urged that directors 
on the audit and nominating committees, for example, be wholly 
independent of management.! 
Both the Watergate affair and the recent international corporate 
bribery scandals have accentuated what many observers have 
recognized as a "disparity between theory and reality in corporate 
governance."2 Referring to a "frustration of our system of corporate 
accountability," Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. has noted that the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce undertook a thorough 
rethinking of corporate accountability "in light of the improper 
payments controversy."3 One of the Congressional responses to the 
fact that over 400 public companies have reported making question-
able or illegal foreign payments has been the enactment of the 
1. See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-45 infra. 
2. Speech by Roberta S. Karmel, former SEC Commissioner, "Politics of Change in 
the Composition and Structure of Corporate Boards," at 5, to the American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Chicago, Illinois (Jan. 11, 1978) [hereinafter 
cited as "Chicago I Speech"]. See generally, Moss, The Crisis of Corporate 
Accountability: A Legislator's View, 3 J. CORP. L. 251 (1978); Coomse, Directors' 
Duties and Responsibilities: New Dimensions, New Opportunities, 95 BANKING L. 
J. 634 (1978); Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34 
Bus. LAW. 7 (1978); SEC's Williams, Panelists at West Coast Institute Review 
Year's Developments in Corporate Accountability, 487 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 
A-14 (Jan. 24, 1979). 
For other commentaries on the issues of corporate governance, see Miller, 
SEC to Prepare Wider Disclosure Rules, N.Y. Times, June 8,1978, at D3, col. 1; 
Goldstein, Who Governs Corporations?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1978, at D4, col. 1; 
Miller, At Odds Over Corporate Governance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1978, at Dl, 
col. 3; Hubbard, Company Boards Don't Need Uncle Sam, N.Y. Times, June 24, 
1979, ~ III at 14, col. 3. 
3. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate 
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1102 n.2 & 
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.4 Section 30A of the Act, which 
is an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1933,5 prohibits 
certain issuers, officers, directors, employees, agents, and stockhold-
ers from making questionable payments and imposes a $10,000 fine 
or imprisonment of up to five years for willful violation by any 
director, officer, or stockholder. 
The overall picture which emerges is one demonstrating concern 
over corporate accountability in general, and the responsibility of the 
board of directors in particular. This article will examine several 
responses to the corporate accountability problem as manifested in 
the recent debate about the structure of boards of directors. The law 
in this area is undeveloped as yet, and the best that one can do in 
most instances is to articulate the various positions in the current 
discussions. For example, former SEC Commissioner Roberta Kar-
mel has noted that the SEC possesses extensive regulatory powers 
under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 "to 
maintain, promote and improve fair corporate suffrage for sharehold-
ers."7 What is as yet unresolved is whether the SEC will be content 
to wait for self-reform in the direction of independent boards, or 
whether it will mandate changes in board structure as a matter of 
law. At present, the SEC has been preaching voluntary restraint, but 
as this article will show, its actions often demonstrate impatience 
with this approach. It is interesting to note that according to former 
Commissioner Karmel, "Our proxy powers are an intrusion of federal 
law into the internal affairs of corporations which could be used to 
affect [sic] changes in board structure. For example, in my opinion, 
the Commission could mandate the use of nominating committees 
under this authority."B 
Increasing recognition and emphasis are being accorded to the 
view that the corporation is a quasi-public institution which must 
serve shareholders and the general public alike. "Corporate existence 
is dependent upon the government. Accordingly, in our democratic 
society, corporations are expected to function for the public good as 
well as for the private benefit of management and shareholders."9 
Unresolved at present is whether, given the widespread perception 
1129 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Coffeel. 
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213,91 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. II 1978». 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976). 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1976). 
7. Karmel, Chicago I Speech, supra note 2, at 18. 
8. [d. See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-50 infra. 
9. Speech by Roberta S. Karmel, former SEC Commissioner, "The Nominating 
Committee as a Corporate Accountability Mechanism," at 4, to the Chicago 
Association of Commerce and Industry, Chicago, Illinois (Apr. 28, 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as "Chicago II Speech"]. 
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that corporate management and boards of directors have been lax in 
th~ir oversight, the problem requires a radical solution such as 
federal chartering, or whether corporations can generate the neces-
sary and sufficient reforms internally. A middle position is Professor 
Cary's proposal for a Federal Minimum Standards Act specifying 
minimum fiduciary standards concerning directors, officers, and 
controlling shareholders in order to remove internal interest conflicts 
and improper behavior. These standards, however, would not impact 
directly on corporate structural reform. 10 For example, Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Citizens' and Shareholders' Rights and Remedies, opposes federal 
chartering, but has established a committee charged with drafting 
legislation that will probably include such proposed federal mini-
mum standards for corporate behavior, setting out uniform responsi-
bilities and liabilities for corporate directors and allowing for 
shareholder enforcement. 11 
Delegation of authority from board members to various commit-
tees is directly implicated in the accountability controversy with 
regard to both the nature and extent of such delegation and the 
characteristics of those individuals comprising particular commit-
tees. The position taken by many, that certain key committees 
should consist of independent or non-affiliated (with management) 
directors, is intended to strengthen corporate stewardship by provid-
ing that major decisions concerning a corporation's future be made 
by parties independent of management and its objectives. 
II. DELEGATED CORPORATE AUTHORITY 
A. Origins 
Initially, at common law, all corporate authority lay with the 
board of directors and could not be delegated. As enunciated in Gillis 
u. Bailey,12 the board of directors' power was original and could not be 
delegated, its powers constituting a grant from the state. Thus, board 
members, having been delegated authority themselves from the 
state, were unable to delegate this authority any further. The board 
lacked common law powers, possessing only those specifically 
granted by statute,13 and the board was held to exercise its powers as 
a fiduciary on behalf of the stockholders.14 Yet, despite the lack of 
explicit statutory authorization, New York courts had upheld the 
10. See id at 26. 
11. Crock, Manager's Journal- Proxy Disclosures, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1978, at 16, 
col. 3. See also note 118 infra. 
12. 21 N.H. 149 (1850). 
13. See Town of Royalton v. Royalton & Woodstock Turnpike Co., 14 Vt. 311 (1842). 
14. Cook v. Berlin Woolen Mills Co., 43 Wis. 433, 439 (1877). Note, Delegation of 
Duties by Corporate Directors, 7 VA. L. REV. 278 (1961). 
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delegation of authority to executive committees of New York 
corporations. 15 
Once the principle of delegation had been recognized, the issue 
then focused on scope. At first, only ministerial duties of the board 
could be delegated. 16 Courts, however, gradually began to expand the 
delegation concept to so-called discretionary acts as well. 17 More 
recently, an "ultimate supervision test" has been applied under 
which boards are held directly responsible for matters relating to 
high-level control rather than for the direct supervision of every 
discretionary act on the corporation's part.1S Today, the scope of 
board delegation is still governed by applicable case law, but in most 
instances, this delegation is explicitly authorized by a statute which 
mayor may not speak in detail as to the scope of delegation and the 
extent to which the board members remain responsible, collectively 
or individually.19 With delegation established both at common law 
and by state statute, the focus necessarily shifted to the relationship 
between the board and the executive committee which became the 
primary recipient of delegated authority. 
B. The Executive Committee 
1. Definition 
An executive committee can be defined as "a group of directors 
established by the board to exercise its authority in the management 
of the corp.orate business."2o Although delegation was permitted, 
there were both case law and statutory restrictions on the extent of 
this delegation, and it remained clear that directors were not 
relieved of their legal responsibilities unless otherwise provided by 
15. Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947); Sheridan Elec. Light Co. v. 
Chatham Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 517,28 N.E. 467 (1891); Hoyt v. Thompson's 
Ex'r, 19 N.Y. 207 (1859). 
16. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1930). 
17. See Yarnell Warehouse & Transfer, Inc. v. Three Ivory Bros. Moving Co., 226 
So. 2d 887 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); Olcott v. Tioga R.R. Co., 27 N.Y. 546 
(1863) (board can clothe committee with authority to conduct corporation's 
ordinary business; however, committee cannot delegate its authority, even to 
one of its members). See also In re Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 6 F.2d 192 (2d 
Cir. 1925) (illustrates the lack of clarity between ministerial and discretionary 
board duties). 
18. See San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.2d 
650 (1937) (dictum), rev'g 101 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). 
19. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1975 & Supp. 1978); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE 
ANN. §§ 2-405, 2-411 (1975 & Supp. 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 712, 717 
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979-80). 
20. Note, Delegation of Duties by Corporate Directors, 47 VA. L. REV. 278, 281-82 
(1961) (citing Steigerwald v. A.M. Steigerwald Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 31, 132 N.E.2d 
373 (1955)); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3He), 9 V.L.A. 184 (1957); ABA-ALI 
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1953, rev. 1959). 
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statute. 21 Of obvious importance, then, is the extent to which the 
executive committee can act on behalf of the full board in committing 
the corporation to a given policy or decision. Any answer to this 
question necessarily implicates the concern for ministerial and 
discretionary duties already discussed.22 
2. Statutory Scope of Executive Committee Delegation 
Today, the executive committee is virtually a "universal phe-
nomenon," with some 97% of large companies having established 
them.23 In every state except one (Arizona), statutes provide the basic 
authority for creation of an executive committee, and generally a 
corporation's bylaws will either "actually establish the executive 
committee and define its duties or permit the board to do so by 
resolution."24 With regard to liability which mayor may not fall on 
the board or certain of its individual members, the major issue is 
described as follows: 
Liability when it arises is most likely to stem from financial 
or business decisions made by insiders sitting on the 
traditional executive or finance committees.' Given this, 
questions arise as to whether liability will fall equally on 
committee and non-committee directors, proportionally more 
on committee directors, or solely on committee directors. 25 
In many cases, the nature of the liability and the existence of 
any exemptions from liability for non-committee members will 
usually be dealt with by statute. Statutory law in Maryland, for 
example, provides that "[t]he bylaws of a corporation may authorize 
its board of directors to: (1) Appoint from among its members an 
executive committee and other committees composed of two or more 
directors."26 Such committees may exercise "any of the powers of the 
21. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES, * 212. at 425 & nn.10-11 (2d ed. 1970). 
22. See discussion in text accompanying notes 9-10 supra. In Tempel v. Dodge, 89 
Tex. 68, 32 S.W. 514 (1895), the Supreme Court of Texas held that a bylaw 
purporting to give the executive committee "all the powers of the board of 
directors" was invalid. For more recent cases covering the scope of executive 
committee authority compare Storer v. Florida Sportservice, Inc., 125 So. 2d 
906 mist. Ct. App. Fla. 1961) (corporation was bound by contract authorized by 
executive committee and made by the president even though bylaws say 
contracts must be approved by the board, if the bylaws also say the executive 
committee shall conduct the corporation's business), with Doyle v. Chladek, 240 
Or. 598, 401 P.2d 18 (1965) (executive committee may not revise stock 
subscription agreement if the bylaws limit its authority to administrative and 
ministerial acts). 
23. McMullen, Committees of the Board of Directors. 29 Bus. LAW. 755, 758 (1974>. 
24. [d. at 760. 
25. [d. at 756. 
26. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. * 2-411<a) (Supp. 1979), 
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board of directors," except five specifically enumerated activities. 27 
An additional provision establishes the "[s]tandard of care required 
of directors" which is also to apply to a director in his capacity as a 
member of a committee of the board on which he serves. Besides a 
good faith standard and the requirement that a director act in a 
manner in which he reasonably believes "to be in the best interests 
of the corporation," the Maryland statute codifies the "ordinarily 
prudent person" standard as it evolved from the common law. 28 Of 
particular importance is section 2-405.l(b)(iii), covering reliance on 
information from others, which explicitly exculpates a non-member 
director when he relies on "[a] committee of the board on which the 
director does not serve, as to a matter within its designated 
authority, if the director reasonably believes the committee to merit 
confidence. "29 
The Maryland provisions follow the basic approach of the Model 
Business Corporation Act and may be compared with similar 
statutory approaches to director liability for board committee acts 
adopted in New York and Delaware. Section 712(a) of the New York 
Business Corporation Law provides that the board may designate 
"from among its members" executive and other committees "if the 
certificate of incorporation or the by-laws so provide."30 Committees 
are specifically forbidden from engaging in certain activities, and it 
would appear that given the amendments made in 1977/1 a 
non-committee director will not be deemed under New York law to 
have performed an act taken by a committee for which he can be held 
liable without proof of direct involvement: 
§ 712. Executive committee and other committees 
(c) Each such committee shall serve at the pleasure of 
the board. The designation of any such committee, the 
delegation thereto of authority, or action by any such 
committee pursuant to such authority shall not alone 
constitute performance by any member of the board who is 
not a member of the committee in question, of his duty to the 
corporation under section 717 (Duty of directors).32 
27. Id. § 2-41H2HiHv) (Supp. 1979l. 
28. See discussion in text accompanying notes 19-27 supra. 
29. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.l<b)(iii) (Supp. 1979l. 
30. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80>-
31. The 1977 amendment replaced the words "shall not alone relieve any director" 
with "or action by any such committee pursuant to such authority shall not 
alone constitute performance by any member of the board who is not a member 
of the committee in question." 
32. N.Y. BIIH. CORP. LAW § 712(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979-801. 
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Additionally, section 717, which deals with the duty of directors, was 
completely rewritten in 1977 so as to incorporate the "ordinarily 
prudent person" standard and to exculpate a director relying on a 
committee in certain specified contexts: 
§ 717. Duty of directors 
A director shall perform his duties as a director, 
including his duties as a member of any committee of the 
board upon which he may serve, in good faith and with that 
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would use under similar circumstances. In perform-
ing his duties, a director shall be entitled to rely on 
information, opinions, reports or statements including finan-
cial statements and other financial data, in each case 
prepared or presented by: 
(3) a committee of the board upon which he does not 
serve, duly designated in accordance with a provision of the 
certificate of incorporation or the by-laws, as to matters 
within its designated authority, which committee the direc-
tor believes to merit confidence, so long as in so relying he 
shall be acting in good faith and with such degree of care, 
but he shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he 
has knowledge concerning the matter in question that would 
cause such reliance to be unwarranted. A person who so 
performs his duties shall have no liability by reason of being 
or having been a director of the corporation.33 
Section 141(c) of the Delaware Corporation Law similarly 
authorizes the board to create committees which, "to the extent 
provided in the resolution of the board of directors, or in the bylaws 
of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the powers and 
authority of the board of directors" in managing the corporation, 
with certain enumerated exceptions.34 Directors and committee 
members are exculpated from liability for good faith reliance on 
books of account or reports from corporate officers, independent 
certified· public accountants, carefully selected appraisers, or "other 
records of the corporation."35 This section, unlike section 2-405.1 of 
the Maryland statute, does not specifically deal with director 
liability for committee action, but an argument could be made to 
include any such action within the concept of "other records of the 
corporation." 
33. Id. § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80l. 
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) <1975l. 
35. [d. § 141(e) (1975). 
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Each of these statutory approaches has in common two elements: 
(1) express provision for the creation of executive and other 
committees either by the board, the charter, or the corporate bylaws, 
and (2) an attempt to articulate a standard of liability in terms of an 
exemption from liability for good faith reliance, or a non-committee 
director's being able to show that he behaved as an ordinarily 
prudent person, or that his behavior as a board member, through his 
own individual activities, did not involve him in the committee's 
"performance."36 As is readily apparent, each of these statutory 
codifications of a liability standard requires fleshing out by the 
common law. Although the principle that delegation to an executive 
committee will not relieve a board, individually or collectively, of the 
responsibility imposed by law is well established,37 the relevant 
factors helping to establish liability or non-liability may include the 
type and size of corporation involved, the scope of activity and 
oversight expected from its directors, the overall circumstances at a 
given time, and the nature of the particular problems creating the 
possible imposition of liability.3s In other words, both inside and 
outside directors who are non-committee members may want to 
appeal to something like an "ordinarily prudent person" standard in 
the event that shareholders or others seek to hold them liable.39 To 
understand how the statutory language has been implemented, it is 
necessary to turn to its application at common law. 
36. This analysis should not be construed as implying that these three approaches 
are the only forms currently used by states. Each state's statute should be 
consulted for any given problem. Professor Folk has made the following 
observations: 
Virtually all new statutes adopt the Model Act provision which 
specifies various director liabilities for improper dividends and other 
distributions and which grants certain defenses, among them good faith 
reliance on books and records and also on financial statements 
represented to be correct by the appropriate officer or certified 
independent accountants. 
While most statutes follow the Model Act, which permits executive 
(or other) committees only if the articles or by-laws so provide, it would 
be preferable to authorize such committees directly if, as, and when 
desired. Of course, the usual limits on delegation and responsibility of 
the full board would remain unaffected, as would any statutory 
restraints on the powers which could be delegated. 
Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L. J. 875, 890, 899-900. 
37. Aurell, The Corporate Executive Committee: A Dilemma for the Nonmember 
Director, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 525 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Aurelll. 
38. See W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 506, at 
118-120 (3d ed. 1978). 
39. Aurell. supra note 37, at 529. 
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3. Common Law Application 
The leading common law case on directors' liability for executive 
committee actions is Kavanaugh v. Gould.40 Recognizing that a board 
of directors could in fact delegate authority to committees,41 the court 
recognized the problem arising from compelling directors to become 
responsible for a corporation's detailed management, namely, "it 
would be wholly impossible for them to accept such a trust."42 In 
explaining non-committee members' liability the court spoke as 
follows: 
The directors generally not upon the executive committee 
are not supposed to have knowledge of the details of the 
business management of the corporation which are not 
submitted to them. In other words, it is not their custom to 
actively search the individual transactions in a bank that 
they may learn the responsibility of its debtors, or the 
nature or value of the collateral. This they intrust, first, to 
the executive officers of the bank, who are carefully chosen 
and paid for their services; secondly, to the supervision of the 
executive committee of their body, which is chosen with a 
special reference to this duty, and to which committee must 
be reported weekly all the transactions of the bank. 
This custom, however, does not relieve directors general-
ly of all responsibility. If the by-laws require monthly 
meetings, they must make diligent effort to be present 
thereat. They must give their best efforts to advance the 
interest of the corporation, both by advice and counsel and 
by active work on behalf of the corporation when such work 
may be assigned to them. If at their meetings, or otherwise, 
information should come to them of irregularity in the 
proceedings of the bank, they are bound to take steps to 
correct those irregularities. The law has no place for dummy 
directors. They are bound generally to use every effort that a 
prudent business man would use in supervising his own 
affairs, with the right, however, ordinarily to rely upon the 
vigilance of the executive committee to ascertain and report 
any irregularity or improvident acts in its management.43 
40. 147 A.D. 281, 131 N.Y.S. 1059 (Sup. Ct. 1911). 
41. Id. at 288,131 N.Y.S. at 1064 (citing Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170 N.Y. 505, 516, 
63 N.E. 554, 556 (1902). 
42. Id. at 289, 131 N.Y.S. at 1065. 
43. Id. at 288-89, 131 N.Y.S. at 1064 (emphasis in original). 
1980] Directors'Liability 199 
With reference to executive committee members, the court was 
specific: 
To the members of the executive committee is assigned the 
duty of detail supervision. With this duty they are bound to 
be on their guard to detect any irregularities or improvident 
acts on the part of the executive officers. They are required 
to scan critically the detailed reports which are made to 
them by such officers. The diligence required of them is 
therefore greater and the rule of their liability more strict 
than that of a director not a member of that committee, for 
to them not only do the stockholders look for protection, but 
the directors themselves, and upon their fidelity to their 
commission all parties must rely.44 
The court concluded with the "necessary inference" that "the 
directors not upon the executive committee are not chargeable with 
knowledge of detail management which need be reported only to the 
executive committee."45 Although Kavanaugh contains an eloquent 
explanation of non-committee member liability, an earlier case, 
Warner v. Penoyer,46 may be cited for the proposition that directors of 
a national bank who were members of the discount and examining 
committees could be held liable while other non-committee directors 
were exonerated.47 
As already indicated, however, limitations on delegated author-
ity and the extent to which non-committee directors will be insulated 
by either their ignorance or inadvertence will depend on rather 
fact-specific circumstances. A few cases, nonetheless, indicate that 
there exists a minimum requirement as to a director's basic 
knowledge of the corporation's activities. Thus, in National Auto-
mobile & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Payne,48 the court noted that 
"[d]irectors may not abdicate their authority by delegating their 
powers of management of the corporation to other persons,"49 and 
went on to add that "[a] knowledge of the basic capital structure of 
the corporation would appear to be a minimal requirement of the 
reasonable exercise of such duties."50 Again, the precise knowledge 
44. [d. at 290, 131 N.Y.S. at 1065. 
45. [d. at 293, 131 N.Y.S. at 1068. 
46. 91 F. 587 (2d Cir. 1898). 
47. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 941, 1047-52 (1969l. 
48. 261 Cal. App. 2d 403, 67 Cal. Rptr. 784 <1968l. 
49. [d. at 412, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 790. 
50. [d. See also Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1964), rev'd on 
other grounds, 17 N.Y.2d 234, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 <1966>. In Platt, the Supreme 
Court of New York County commented that: 
It is the obvious duty of directors to know what is transpiring in the 
business affairs of their corporation. They cannot assume the responsi-
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required will depend upon the circumstances, as is illustrated by the 
SEC's recent decision in In re National Telephone CO.,5l finding that 
the outside directors had a duty to be aware of the need for 
"corrective disclosure" when the press releases prepared by manage-
ment were inaccurate: 
In general, outside directors should be expected to maintain 
a general familiarity with their company's communications 
with the public. 
Moreover, as here, when important events central to the 
survival of the company are involved, directors have a 
responsibility affirmatively to keep themselves informed of 
developments within the company and to seek out the nature 
of corporate disclosures to determine if adequate disclosures 
are being made.52 
As both Payne and the National Telephone release indicate, the 
"ordinarily prudent person" standard will depend on factors peculiar 
to a corporation's present difficulties which threaten imposition of 
liability. Directors, then, will be 
[c]harged with knowledge [they] actually possessed or which 
[they] might have possessed had [they] diligently pursued 
[their] duties .... In other words, their duty is to be 
measured by what prudent men would do in similar 
circumstances being in possession not only of the knowledge 
and the information they possessed or could have possessed 
by diligent attention to all their duties not only as directors 
and officers, but also as members of the Executive Com-
mittee.53 
An almost inescapable inference from the above series of cases is 
that a director's liability will be greater in proportion to his 
responsibility concerning matters within the purview of the commit-
tee on which he serves. As one commentator has noted, this inference 
may be drawn from language in Escott v. BarChris Construction 
bilities of their fiduciary' position, then simply close their eyes to avoid 
the consequences by the mere failure to act. While corporate directors 
are not liable for errors of judgment, nevertheless, the law holds them 
accountable for that which they reasonably should have known or 
discovered in the discharge of their duties. . .. 
42 Misc. 2d at 643,249 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
51. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~81,41O (Jan. 16, 1978). 
52. [d. at 88,880. 
53. Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 196-97, 
273 N.Y.S.2d 16, 27 (966) (citation omitted). 
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Corp.54 In BarChris, liability was imposed under section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933,55 because directors either knew or failed to 
exercise "due diligence" in discovering certain undisclosed facts. Yet, 
the court undertook a detailed inquiry into the "due diligence" 
defenses of some ten individuals, finding that standards of liability 
varied in relation to an individual's knowledge, experience, profes-
sional background (for example, the lawyer, Birnbaum) as well as 
what could be expected of him. With regard to Auslander, a 
relatively new outside director, the court found that he failed to 
establish his due diligence defense, commenting that "Section 11 
imposes liability in the first instance upon a director, no matter how 
new he is."56 Grant, a director and signer of the faulty registration 
statement, also failed the due diligence test, and the court remarked 
that: 
As the director most directly concerned with writing the 
registration statement and assuring its accuracy, more was 
required of him in the way of reasonable investigation than 
could be fairly expected of a director who had no connection 
with this work.57 
What emerges from a consideration of both state and federal 
common law decisions is that a director's liability for improper 
delegation of authority may be greater, even under a potentially 
exculpating statute in state cases, if he fails to exercise that level of 
due care consistent with the judicially evolved criteria which provide 
meaning to phrases such as "good faith reliance" or "ordinarily 
prudent person." Membership on a committee appears to impose 
automatically a higher standard of care. Such an imposition is 
consistent with both the view that more responsibility entails more 
exposure to liability and the "ordinarily prudent person" standard, 
since more knowledge and exposure to corporate affairs through 
54. 283 F. Supp. 643, (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Friedman, Committees of the Board and 
Corporate Disclosure Policy, in 2 MANAGING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 553, 568 
(1978). 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). 
56. 283 F. Supp. at 688. 
57. [d. at 690 (emphasis added). For a more detailed analysis of BarChris, see Parts 
I and II of Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The 
BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 199 (1969). An assessment of the emerging 
federal law standards for director liability is necessarily beyond the scope of 
this article. For a concise survey of this law, see Wander, Protecting Directors 
Against Securities Liabilities, in PREVENTING DIRECTORS' LIABILITY UNDER THE 
SECURITIES LAWS 1976, Practising Law Institute Course Handbook Series No. 
222, 145 (1976). There is also a series of common law decisions imposing a 
stricter standard of care upon inside as opposed to outside directors. See, e.g., 
Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Savings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 306,8 
S.W. 885 (1888); Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 283 Mo. 237, 223 S.W. 423 (1920). 
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committee membership is generally expected to raise the level of 
"prudence" expected.58 In short, the right to rely is "inherent in the 
nature of a director's duty of inquiry," and the "proper inquiry 
relates to the degree and nature of the reliance"; however, "the 
standard will vary depending upon the position of the director within 
the corporation and his own special skills and expertise."59 One 
commentator raises two questions which relate directly to these 
various standards: 
May a director rely on the report of an audit committee 
without making independent investigation? 
Should the reliance concept be expanded so that the director 
may rely upon actions by committees of the board pursuant 
to duly delegated authority?60 
Although the audit committee will be considered separately,61 it 
would seem that in light of the above discussion both of these 
questions can be answered by referring to the appropriate state 
statutory language and any accompanying common law standards 
fleshing out the statutory principles. What the commentator does not 
address, however, is the issue raised by BarChris and its progeny of 
whether the current reliance on a state statute and common law 
approach will be overshadowed by federally mandated standards of 
corporate accountability and director responsibility. It is to this area, 
literally on the frontier of the current legal debate, to which this 
article will now turn. 
4. An Evolving Federal Standard of Directors' Liability? 
Although BarChris was the first case to interpret section 11 of 
the Securities Act of 193362 and result in the imposition of liability, 
its holding cannot be restricted to the confines of federal securities 
law. The liability standards articulated in BarChris are one bit of 
recent evidence indicating the evolution of a federal due care 
standard which would impact upon the current pattern of what 
might be called directors' "reliance liability." In 1974, even before 
the revelations of corporate slush funds and illegal foreign payments, 
it was evident that the SEC favored enlistment of the board of 
directors to help prevent corporate wrongdoing: "It expects the board 
of directors to PB:Y close attention to the functioning and indepen-
58. See text accompanying notes 25-53 supra. 
59. Ruder, Satisfaction of Directors' Liability by Reliance on Others, in PRt;Vt;NTING 
DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS 189. 196 (19741. 
60. [d. at 200. 
61. See text accompanying notes 32-43 supra. 
62. 15 U.S.C. * 77k (1976). 
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dence of the outside auditors through audit committees comprised 
entirely of outside directors."63 The calls for establishing independent 
boards of directors have been heard with increasing frequency, but as 
yet, aside from the audit committee requirement imposed by the 
NYSE as a listing prerequisite,64 no corporate structural changes 
have been mandated. Nonetheless, many large corporations such as 
Coca-Cola, Citicorp, and Allied Chemical have established ethical 
guidelines for their officers, directors, and employees.65 Yet, as 
Leonard Silk has recognized: 
The corporate reformation will be enduring only if 
statements of ethical standards are matched by the building 
of institutions and procedures within the corporation to 
insure that the standards are enforced. This will involve 
strengthening the independence and oversight powers of 
boards of directors and their audit committees. It will 
involve improving the flow of information to the board and 
up and down the organization. It will also require estab-
lishing oversight and review committees at different levels.66 
The entire reliance structure, however, could be radically 
changed in the event that corporations move in the direction of more 
independent boards of directors. Both the Business Roundtable, an 
association of 190 chief executive officers which takes positions on 
public policy issues, and SEC Chairman Williams have endorsed the 
"strong tendency" of large United States corporations to have boards 
consisting of a majority of outsiders.s7 Williams, however, stressing 
again the "quasi-public" character of the corporation, has called for 
an independent board of directors "from which outside counsel and 
both investment and commercial bankers would be excluded. In his 
view, the only member of management who should sit on a 
corporation's board of directors is the chief executive - and that 
officer should not act as chairman."66 Although most of these 
suggestions are still at the "talking" stage, there is evidence that 
individuals such as Stanley Sporkin, Director of the SEC's Enforce-
ment Division, favor a legislated investors' bill of rights which would 
63. Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities: A Program of Due Care, 1 
J. CORP. LAW 57. 71 (1975) (referring to Securities Act Release No. 5550, FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 72,187 <Dec. 20, 1974» [hereinafter cited as Caplin]. 
64. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra. 
65. Silk, Ethical Guides for Companies, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1978, at D2, col. 1. 
66. [d. 
67. 437 SEC. REG. & L. REP. <BNA) A-21 (Jan. 25, 1978). 
68. [d. at A-22. 
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have the net effect of "reopening the federal courts to our sharehold-
ers."69 Furthermore, Sporkin claims that the SEC "or another 
agency" has the authority to set qualifications for corporate directors 
as well as to disqualify those who fail to discharge adequately their 
fiduciary responsibility.70 
One example of the SEC's increased activism in this area - of 
its greater willingness to look over the directors' shoulders - is the 
1977 Consent Order filed with respect to the Zale Corporation. In 
SEC v. Zale COrp.,'l the SEC used evidence of the company's 
half-hearted investigation of certain inside directors as proof of a 
securities law violation. Specifically, an independent committee of 
outsiders charged with conducting the investigation was adjudged by 
the SEC to have failed to "conduct a meaningful independent 
investigation."72 Eventually, the board of'directors abolished the 
committee leaving the investigation to be conducted by the chair-
man's son. As Professor Coffee has observed, at present there is very 
little "judicial interest in piercing the veil of formalism to achieve a 
meaningful definition of board 'independence.' "73 To the extent that 
corporations attempt to meet the criticisms voiced by Chairman 
Williams with token reform, they "[invite] SEC activism to fill the 
void, resulting in an overexpansion of that agency'g jurisdiction that 
may well be undesirable."74 What this entails for the entire "reliance 
liability" structure is obviously the interjection of federal standards 
into areas currently left to state court assessment, such as the degree 
of expertise of a director, his experience with and knowledge of the 
corporation, and the other more or less "fact specific" elements taken 
into consideration by the "good faith" and "prudent person" stand-
ards. 
Insofar as the executive committee is concerned, the current 
debate has focused on the need to staff it with outsiders who are 
independent of management. As of the present, the debate has been 
just that - a debate. In the area of the audit committee, however, a 
long-standing debate has materialized into a concrete rule to be. 
imposed by the NYSE on all listed companies. 
69. 402 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-I (May 11, 1977>-
70.Id. 
71. SEC v. Zale Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 8081 (Aug. 24, 1977). 
72. Id. at 2. 
73. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1236. 
74. Id. 
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III. THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
A. History 
The idea of an audit committee was suggested by the SEC in 
1940 in its report on the McKesson & Robbins investigation.75 Very 
little activity, however, occurred with regard to audit committees 
until 1967 when the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (AICPA) recommended appointing a committee of outside 
directors to nominate and work with independent auditors.76 In 1972, 
the SEC endorsed the creation of corporate audit committees.77 A 
year later the New York Stock Exchange made a similar endorse-
ment.78 
In light of the revelations concerning corporate bribery and 
illegal payments which surfaced after the Watergate affair, the audit 
committee took on even greater importance. Specifically, an audit 
committee on financial accounting was seen as a means of providing 
a direct channel of communications between the board and the 
corporation's auditors: 
It lessens the outside auditors' direct reliance on manage-
ment and helps the outside directors meet their obligations 
of due care. Generally, it recommends the auditors to be 
selected by the company, reviews reporting policies and 
practices, reviews the scope and results of an audit, and 
reviews the adequacy of the company's accounting and 
financial controls. 
Since 1972, the SEC has indicated its broad support for 
the creation of an audit committee. Corporations have been 
urged to form these committees so as to increase the 
independence of the auditors. On December 20, 1974, the 
SEC took steps to implement its position by amending the 
proxy rules to require inclusion in proxy materials of (a) 
information concerning the existence and composition of the 
audit committee and (b) if none exists, a statement to that 
75. 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IJ 72,020 (Dec. 5, 1940). See Mautz & Neumann, The 
Effective Corporate Audit Committee, 48 HARV. Bus. REV. 57, 59 (Nov.-Dec. 
1970); Feller & Loo, The Audit Committee, in 2 MANAGING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
633, 635 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Feller & Loo]; Greene & Falk, The Audit 
Committee - A Measured Contribution to Corporate Governance: A Realistic 
Appraisal of its Objectives and Functions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1229 (1979); 3 J. CORP. 
L. 400 (978). 
76. AICPA Executive Committee Statement, 124 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 10 (Sept. 1967). 
77. 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IJ 72,145 (Mar. 23, 1972). 
78. Feller & Loo, supra note 75, at 635. 
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effect. Among other things the SEC believes that the audit 
committee "would lessen the accountants' direct reliance on 
management and would put them directly in touch with 
outside members of the Board whose performance was less 
specifically being reported on in financial statements, thus 
increasing the accountants' independence."79 
Thus, the audit committee was viewed as a key feature of corporate 
structure, having become endowed with a stature second only to the 
board of directors itself because of the New York Stock Exchange's 
requirement after 1977 that all listed companies establish audit 
committees by June 30, 1978. Even before 1977, however, the 
required use of audit committees in several SEC consent settlements 
became increasingly common. so 
B. The 1977 New York Stock Exchange Rule 
Once an audit committee was established, it was a different 
matter altogether as to who could or should serve on the committee. 
For instance, the extent to which the committee should include 
management participation or remain independent of senior manage-
ment involvement continues to be debated. s1 
With respect to companies with common stock listed on the 
NYSE, however, this uncertainty was resolved on March 9, 1977, 
with the adoption of the NYSE's Audit Committee Policy requiring 
establishment of such a committee by June 30, 1978.s2 The Exchange 
required that the committee be "comprised solely of directors 
independent of management and free from any relationship that, in 
the opinion of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment as a committee member."s:l 
79. Caplin, supra note 63, at 77-78 (quoting Securities Act Release No. 5550, FEn. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 72,187, at 62,427 <Dec. 20, 1974»). 
80. See, e.g., SEC v. Mattei, Inc. [1974-75 Transfer Binder! FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH), C] 94,504 (Oct. 1, 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc. [1973-1974 Transfer Binderl 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), c· 94,504 (Apr. 11, 1974); SEC v. Coastal States Gas 
Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973); SEC v. Zale Corp., 
SEC Litigation Release No. 8081 (August 24, 1977); SEC v. Killearn. SEC 
Litigation Civil Action No. TCA-75-67 (May 2. 1977). See also J. BA!'ON & J. 
BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: R()I.~:. SEI.ECTION AND LE(;"!. STATlIS OF 
THE BOARn 117-27 (1975); TH~; COOP~;RS & LYBRAND AlIDIT Cmnll'rn:~: GllfDE (2d 
ed. 1976>. 
81. Compare Lam, Management Representation on Audit Committees. Tm: CPA J. 
33 (Nov. 1975) (recommends that if management is to be represented on audit 
committee. it should comprise a minority of its members) with Lovdal. Makill~ 
the Audit Committee Work, 55 HARV. BlIs. REV. 108 (Mar·Apr. 1977) (opposes 
management involvement>. See also 3 J. CORI'. L. 400. 420-21 !l978). 
82. NYSE GUIIlE (CCH) « 2495H (1978>. 
83. [d. at ·1229. 
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The SEC was clearly pleased with the Exchange's listing 
requirement. In a letter to Exchange President William Batten dated 
May 11, 1976, then SEC Chairman Hills had suggested an amend-
ment of the Exchange's listing policies in order to increase the role 
and percentage of outside directors on publicly listed companies.84 In 
testimony later that year before a Senate Committee, Hills stated 
that he favored a majority of outsiders on the board.85 Additionally, 
on January 19, 1977, the Commission proposed a series of rule 
amendments requiring registered and reporting issuers under the 
Securities Exchange Act to maintain accurate corporate books and 
records as well as an "attendant system of internal accounting 
controls."86 As with the current fabric of common law liability, 
standards of effective control systems will depend on particular 
circumstances: 
Systems of control will, of course, vary from company to 
company. The size of the business, diversity of operations, 
degree of centralization of financial and operating manage-
ment, amount of contact by top management with day-to-day 
operations, and numerous other circumstances are factors 
which management must consider in establishing and 
maintaining an internal accounting controls system.87 
Director liability would be implicated under new rule 13b-2 which 
requires management to devise and maintain a system of internal 
auditing controls. 
As of June 30, 1978, creation of an audit committee became a 
listing requirement for the NYSE. There have been no legal opinions 
as to the degree to which creation of such committees entails a 
higher standard of director due diligence. Director liability for 
reliance on an audit committee's report would seem to be subject to 
the prevailing common law and statutory approach discussed earlier 
in connedion with executive committees.88 Under the common law 
standards, audit committee members would appear to assume 
greater liability than non-audit committee directors. The extent to 
which such delegation of authority is required, however, may tend to 
complicate the analysis, especially in light of the fairly rigid 
requirements as to who can and cannot serve on the audit 
84. SENATE BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., 94TH CONGo 2D S~;HH., 
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISHION ON QUESTIONABLE AND 
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICEH, Exhibit D. (Comm. Print 1976). 
85. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) • 80,611 (June 21, 1976). 
86. [d. at ~80,896 (Jan. 19, 1977). 
87. [d. at 87,379. 
88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. * 78m(b)(2HB) (1976). 
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committee.89 At the same time, a showing of pro forma compliance 
with the NYSE Rule may itself be enough to constitute a director's 
"due diligence" in relying on an audit committee. Although no new 
89. The New York Stock Exchange Audit Committee Policy provides as follows: 
Audit Committee Policy 
Each domestic company with common stock listed on the Exchange, 
as a condition of listing and continued listing of its securities on the 
Exchange, shall establish no later than June 30, 1978 and maintain 
thereafter an Audit Committee comprised solely of directors indepen-
dent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion 
of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of 
independent judgment as a committee member. Directors who are 
affiliates of the company or officers or employees of the company or its 
subsidiaries would not be qualified for Audit Committee membership. 
A director who was formerly an officer of the company or any of its 
subsidiaries may qualify for membership even though he may be 
receiving pension or deferred compensation payments from the company 
if, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such person will exercise 
independent judgment and will materially assist the function of the 
committee. However, a majority of the Audit Committee shall be 
directors who were not formerly officers of the company or any of its 
subsidiaries. 
Supplementary Material 
In order to deal with the complex relationships that arise, the 
following guidelines are provided to assist Boards of Directors to 
observe the spirit of the policy in selecting members of the Audit 
Committee. 
A director who has, or is a partner, officer or director of an 
organization that has customary commercial, industrial, banking or 
underwriting relationships with the company which are carried on in 
the ordinary course of business on an arms-length basis may qualify for 
membership unless, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such 
director is not independent of management or the relationship would 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee 
member. 
A director who, in addition to fulfilling the customary director's 
role, also provides additional services directly for the Board of Directors 
and is separately compensated therefor, would nonetheless qualify for 
membership on the Audit Committee. However, a director who, in 
addition to his director's role, also acts on a regular basis as an 
individual or representative of an organization serving as a professional 
advisor, legal counselor consultant to management, would not qualify 
if, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such relationship is material 
to the company, the organization represented or the director. 
A director who represents or is a close relative of a person who 
would not qualify as a member of the Audit Committee in the light of 
the policy would likewise not qualify for the committee. However, if the 
director is a close relative of an employee who is not an executive officer 
or if there are valid countervailing reasons, the Board of Directors' 
decision as to eligibility shall govern. 
While SEC Rule 405 may be helpful to the Board of Directors in 
determining whether a particular director is an "affiliate" or a close 
relative for purposes of this policy, it is not intended to be so technically 
applied as to go beyond the spirit of this policy. 
NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 11 2495H (adopted by the Exchange March 9, 1977). 
For a general discussion of the liability of committee members and 
noncommittee directors, see 3 J. CORP. L. 400, 416-17 (1978). 
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standards of liability have as yet evolved, as with executive 
committees, the law may be in flux at the fringes, especially when 
one considers the SEC's recent actions in light of corporate 
misconduct as a possible model for corporate reform. 
C. An Emerging Federal Standard? 
If the outside directors on an audit committee were to prove to be 
"shams," would the directors as a whole be liable? What if the trend 
toward outsider boards were simultaneously undercut by the fact 
that many such directors were h~nd-picked by the chief executive 
officer?90 In discussing the possible creation of a federal duty of due 
care for directors, Professor Coffee refers to the somewhat unusual 
SEC v. Shiell complaint brought by the Division of Enforcement in 
which "directors (including outside directors) who failed to control 
management adequately could be found to violate the federal 
securities laws, because implicitly they falsely represented the 
material fact that they were in control of the company."91 As further 
evidence of a federal due care standard, Coffee points to proposed 
(now effective) rule 13b_2,92 and the NYSE audit committee rule.93 In 
the case of sham complIance with the audit committee rule, it is even 
possible that a court might imply a private right of action on the 
basis that the rule was a substitute for direct federal regulation or 
served to support an .. 'evidence of negligence' approach."94 Although 
such a duty might be unknown to common law, it could be regarded 
as intended to protect the shareholder-plaintiff, and Judge Friendly 
has stated that an implied private right of action could be found 
when an Exchange rule served as a "substitute" for SEC regulation 
and imposed a duty unknown at common law.95 In the case of the 
Shiell complaint, the theory advanced by the SEC would clearly 
undercut the reliance on management holding of state cases such as 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. CO.96 
A fc,urth indication of expanded federal standards in the area of 
corporate management is the recent legal opinion of the SEC's 
general counsel on the Commission's authority to require public 
90. Professor Coffee cites a study indicating that in 46.5«< of the companies 
surveyed, the chief executive officer was the "initial decision maker regarding a 
prospective director." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1233. 
91. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1249; SEC v. Shiell, SEC Litigation Release No. 7763 
(Jan. 31, 1977>' 
92. Although a private litigant would lack standing, the SEC could require 
restitution to the corporation as "an ancillary equitable remedy." Coffee. supra 
note 3, at 1273. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 1274. 
95. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co .• 358 F.2d 178. 182 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 
385 U.S. 817 (1966>. 
96. 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 <i9631. Coffee. supra note 3. at 1249. 
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companies to establish independent audit committees. 97 In this 
opinion, Harvey L. Pitts, the SEC's former General Counsel, 
explained the statutory grounds on which the SEC had "ample 
authority" to promulgate such a requirement. An indication of the 
SEC's readiness to bootstrap its position is Pitt's reference to the 
SEC's approval of the NYSE audit committee rule98 and the 
enactment of new section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.99 
Cutting against this heightened SEC activity, however, is a 
recent United States Supreme Court decision, Santa Fe Industries, 
Inc. v. Green,loo which may serve to limit the ability of lower courts to 
imply a private cause of action in circumstances in which" 'the cause 
of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law.' "101 The Court's 
limiting language in Santa Fe was expressed as follows: 
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are 
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of 
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, 
particularly where established state policies of corporate 
regulation would be overridden. As the Court stated in Cort 
v. Ash,"Corporations are creatures of state law, and inves-
tors commit their funds to corporate directors on the 
, understanding that, except where federal law expressly 
requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation."I02 
Interestingly enough, the director of the SEC's Enforcement Divi-
sion, Stanley Sporkin, has already gone on record as opposing Santa 
Fe. 103 
As noted above, the law in this area is unsettled with regard to 
both the likely de facto emergence of a federal standard and the 
expectations to be accorded audit committees. While welcoming the 
initiatives taken by the stock exchanges, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, and the AICP A in compelling the creation of 
audit committees, SEC Chairman Williams noted that: 
97. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,535 (Mar. 2, 1978l. 
98. [d. at 80,177. 
99. [d. at 80,181. 
100. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
101. [d. at 478 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40 (1977) 
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.s. 66, 78 (1975»). 
102. 430 U.S. at 479 (emphasis in original), See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977). 
103. Wall St. J., May 5, 1977, at 3, col. 2. 
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These efforts are important, but the next question which 
must be faced is the definition of the audit committee's 
responsibilities. At present, many audit committees are, 
undoubtedly, not working effectively, and may serve more to 
provide windowdressing than to add substance to the 
accountability process. . . . But no consideration of the role 
of directors is complete without underscoring the importance 
of an effective audit committee. 1M 
211 
In terms of substantive liability, the mandated use of audit 
committees may directly impact upon the current status of director 
liability for delegated authority. At this time, however, one can only 
reconstruct the continuing dialogue, as legal certainties have not yet 
emerged. 
IV. OTHER IMPORTANT COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS: NOMINATING AND 
COMPENSATION COMMITTEES 
A. Nominating Committees 
Apparently, the focus by the SEC, at least during the past six 
years, on corporate restructuring and management accountability 
has been primarily on promoting the appointment of outside 
directors in the hope of achieving a more independent board and in 
the establishment of audit committees which, in theory, will reduce 
the instances of illegal bribes and corporate slush funds. With most 
of the attention going to audit committees, the nominating commit-
tee has not been as carefully considered; however, as already noted, 
at least one SEC commissioner believes the Commission has the 
authority to compel the use of nominating committees through its 
proxy regulations. In its proposed model board and committee 
structure for a public corporation, the Section on Corporation, 
Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association 
published a Corporate Director's Guidebook,105 which recommended a 
minimum of three working committees, namely the audit, nominat-
ing, and compensation committees. The guidebook recommends that 
the audit and compensation committees be staffed with non-
104. Speech by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams, "The Role of the Director in 
Corporate Accountability," to the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan 
(May 1, 1978). 
105. A Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976). See also The Overview 
Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979), for a discussion 
of the roles played by nominating, compensation, and audit committees. 
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management directors, a majority of whom should be unaffiliated, 
while the nominating committee be made up entirely of unaffiliated 
non-management directors. lOG Thus far, the ancillary measures 
required by the SEC (creation of independent compliance and 
executive committees) have not included creation of nominating 
committees; however, as a logical outgrowth of the SEC's general 
corporate accountability concerns, the best way to ensure an 
independent board and effective executive or audit committees is to 
have candidates independently chosen. 107 
Former Commissioner Karmel focused directly on the role of the 
nominating committee as a means by which the SEC can broaden its 
approach to corporate management in order to focus more on 
"general issues of social significance" and less upon shareholders' 
concerns. lOB She argued that the nominating committee is neither a 
radical device nor a costly one. It can, however, become "the single 
most effective force in improving corporate governance because of its 
impact over time on the composition of the board and, accordingly, 
the succession of management."109 Yet, despite her enthusiasm for 
nominating committees, she remains "unpersuaded that the Com-
mission should require or urge all public companies, or request the 
exchange to require their listed issuers to establish nominating 
106. Id. at 33-35. A "management" director is one devoting "substantially full time 
and attention to the affairs of the corporation, one of its subsidiaries, or any 
other corporation controlled by the corporation." An "affiliated non-
management director" is one who has "since the beginning of the last fiscal 
year of the corporation engaged in, or proposes in the future to engage in, 
transactions with the corporation which are material to the corporation or to 
the director (or to his affiliated corporation), or if he has close familial ties to a 
member of key management." Id. at 31. 
107. Former Commissioner Karmel noted that "[n]ormally, board committees 
required to be established must maintain an independent majority acceptable 
to the Commission." Karmel, Chicago I Speech, supra note 2, at 16. She also 
notes that section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.s.C. 
§ 80a-10 (1976), requiring at least 40% of the board of a registered investment 
company to be filled with unaffiliated persons or independent directors, may 
prove an indirect influence over corporate structure: "Although in practice the 
independence of unaffiliated directors has not always been achieved, the 
Commission has substantial authority under the 1940 Act to require a board 
model which would insure the statutory standards of independence." Id. at 17. 
At present this standard of independence is not fully defined, although Ms. 
Karmel notes that the Commission's statements on independence of accoun-
tants may influence the concept of independence as it pertains to membership 
on corporate boards. Id. 
108. Karmel, Chicago II Speech supra note 9, at 9. 
109. Id. at 10. In fact, during the two years since Ms. Karmel's speech, "nominating 
committees dominated by outside directors have become fixtures on mort 
corporate boards." Harris, Survey Finds Board Nominating Panels Help 
Determine Management Succession, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1980, at 21, col. 4. 
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committees."llo Favoring governmental self-restraint, she nonethe-
less 
endorse[s] a requirement that registrants state in their 
proxy material or their annual report to shareholders 
whether there is a nominating committee on the board and, 
if so, who the members are. In the view of the Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure it would be reasonable 
to require this type of disclosure because registrants are 
required already to identify the members of the Executive 
and Audit Committees. lll 
Curiously enough, though, this approach is precisely that followed by 
the SEC in the case of audit committees, when the Commission 
anticipated that corporations would prefer to create such committees 
rather than disclose that they did not have them. Although one can 
only predict on the basis of the SEC's prior behavior, former 
Commissioner Karmel's approach sounds like a warning that despite 
her faith in the "innovative capability of the private sector . . . 
corporations which ignore the voices clamoring for corporate govern-
ance reforms do so at their peril."ll2 SEC Chairman Williams has 
already been quoted to the effect that "regardless of the number of 
management directors, committees composed exclusively of indepen-
dent directors for audit, nomination of directors, executive compensa-
tion, and conflict of interest are essential. "113 One of the indications of 
the possible effect this SEC prodding may have, is a survey by 
KornlFerry International, an executive research firm, which shows 
that although most of the 1500 NYSE companies have had audit 
committees for some time, only nineteen percent of the 501 
companies surveyed had nominating committees. Eight years ago, 
however, practically none of the companies surveyed had nominating 
110. ld. at 11. 
111. ld. at 12. Former Commissioner Karmel specifically wanted disclosure relating 
to nominee selection procedure and criteria: 
Companies would be required to discuss the process by which the 
committee selects new nominees for election as directors and determines 
whether to renominate sitting directors. They would be required to state 
whether the committee solicits or reviews shareholders' recommenda-
tions for nominees to fill Board vacancies or for removal of Board 
members and to describe the committee's screening criteria and 
procedure to enable more informed and appropriate shareholder partici-
pation. 
ld. at 14. 
112. ld. at 15. 
113. Speech by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams, "The Role of the Director in 
Corporate Accountability," to the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan, 
May 1, 1978. 
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committees.1I4 The same survey also noted a decline in the percent-
age of commercial and investment bankers as well as attorneys 
sitting as "outside" directors. Nonetheless, some eighty percent of the 
boards surveyed were headed by a chairman who also served as chief 
executive officer. liS 
The overall climate relating to mandated SEC disclosure has 
been one of continued escalation. The possibility that the SEC will 
amend its proxy rules so as to make it easier for shareholders to 
support their own nominees for election to corporate boards is 
already being discussed.1I6 Within the past few years, the SEC has 
told its staff to begin drafting rules which will require disclosure of: 
-the existence, composition and function of committees of 
directors that nominate other directors and executives, set 
pay, oversee the company's financial records or perform 
similar functions. 
-the existence of personal or business relationships between 
directors and management. Directors would have to be 
classified as management directors, affiliated non manage-
ment directors, such as the company's outside lawyer, and 
unaffiliated nonmanagement directors, that is, someone who 
doesn't have anything to do with the company.lIi 
Although revisions in the proxy rules to permit greater shareholder 
involvement in the nominating process will probably not occur in the 
near future, such revisions are likely, and the proposed requirement 
to disclose the existence vel non of nominating committees may be 
regarded as a step in that direction. As Chairman Williams has 
stressed, only voluntary changes in corporate board structures can 
retard "the accelerating rush to federal corporate governance 
legislation. "118 
114. Schorr, Corporate Directors Scored For Lax Scrutiny of Managements' Acts. Wall 
St. J., Apr. 10, 1978, at 1, col. 6. More recent statistics, however, demonstrate a 
dramatic increase in the number of corporations which have established 
overview committees. The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 
Bus. LAW. 1837, 1863 (1979), 
115. [d. 
116. [d. Schorr writes that: "To foster more audit committees composed of nonman-
agement directors, especially at companies not listed on exchanges. the SEC is 
pressing accountants not to accept as clients any public corporations that lack 
such committees." [d. at 1, col. 6. 
117. Wall St. J., June 8, 1978, at 8, col. 2. 
118. Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1978, at 3, col. 1. Just one example of this trend may be 
seen in legislation proposed by Senator Metzenbaum which would address 
directly the duties and roles of audit and nominating committees. 503 S~:('. RE(;. 
L. REP. !BNA) A-2 (May 16, 1979). A description of the proposed changes in 
proxy rules which would mandate greater disclosure may be found at 462 SE('. 
RE(;. L. REP. !BNA) A-18 (July 19, 1978). 
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B. Compensation Committees 
In comparison with those committees already discussed, there is 
very little literature available on compensation or salary commit-
tees. 119 Most of the references to such committees have been in 
conjunction with calls for greater use of other board committees, such 
as executive, audit, and nominating committees. Thus, Chairman 
Williams has been quoted to the effect that, "given a lesser number 
of independent directors, then committees composed exclusively of 
independent directors for audit, nomination of directors, executive 
compensation, public policy, and conflict of interest, become essen-
tial."120 Compensation committees will figure prominently in any 
effort to increase corporate accountability, because salaries set by an 
independent committee would reduce the chance of dominance by 
corporate management. The spotlight so far has been primarily on 
the audit committee, but the new SEC disclosure rules currently 
being drafted will certainly have the effect of increasing the number 
of compensation committees being established,121 again because 
corporations will prefer to create such committees rather than 
disclose their nonexistence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The status of director "reliance liability" is presently in a state 
offlux. Although one can rely on the state common law and statutory 
approach, there are ever-increasing signs of the arrival of federal 
fiduciary standards for corporate management and director liability. 
Of the four committees considered in this article only the executive 
committee is susceptible of extensive commentary, primarily in light 
of the long history of delegation to that committee. As has been 
explained, the remaining three committees have been the subject of 
increasing attention by the SEC, yet no clear liability rules have 
emerged to displace the current common law and statutory approach. 
119. For a general treatment of compensation committees, see J. BACON & J. BROWN, 
CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE SELECTION, AND L~;(;AL STATUS (W TIlE 
BOARD 127-34 (1975). 
120. Speech by SEC Chairman Williams, "Corporate Accountability," to the Fifth 
Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California, Jan. 18, 1978. 
121. Wall St. J., June 8, 1978, at 8, col. 2. 
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Focusing for a moment on current corporate committee practices, 
one cannot help but ask whether all of this concern over committee 
creation is only a tempest in a teapot, especially in view of the fact 
that most large corporations already have audit committees and 
close to twenty percent have nominating committees. One might be 
tempted to dismiss the SEC's concerns as an overly dramatic reaction 
to the corporate bribery scandals; however, there is sentiment both 
within the Congress and the SEC that if voluntary changes are not 
forthcoming in corporate board structures, federally mandated 
changes will be created and imposed. The issue at the moment is just 
how much corporate compliance is enough to satisfy the SEC. The 
answer may well depend on whether the SEC can be bought off by 
"big" corporations' compliance so that smaller, less visible corpora-
tions receive, in effect, shelter from further SEC disclosure require-
ments. In advising a public corporation in light of the current trends 
articulated in this article, an attorney should seriously consider 
suggesting the creation of audit, nominating, and compensation 
committees in instances in which they do not presently exist. 
